wrote the preface. In 1912 he told Ottoline Morrell that CliTord was "an absolutely Wrst-rate mathematician, [who] cared immensely about philosophy…. All his writing has the clearness and force that comes of white-hot intellectual passion."
4 So one problem in dealing with Russell's encounter with CliTord is to explain this comparative silence. In this paper, we hope to explain one part of it: the fact that Russell, in his early work on the philosophy of geometry, did not take more seriously CliTord's ideas about spaces of variable curvature. We suggest Russell had good reason to neglect such models of space. A coherent theory of measurement for spaces of non-constant curvature had not been produced. This may explain why Russell chose to defend as a priori spaces of constant curvature in his 1897 book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. CliTord did not clarify how measurement was operational in spaces of heterogeneous curvature; neither did Einstein's theory of relativity oTer a solution to this stumbling block. Whitehead objected to Einstein's theory on these grounds. In its place Whitehead proposed an alternate theory that preserved the constant curvature of space and, therefore, a familiar sense of measurement as well.
i.wrussell, clifford, and clifford's philosophy of mathematics
It is clear from Russell's preface to The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences that one of the causes of his youthful enthusiasm for CliTord was what he took to be CliTord's belief that the exact sciences, and in particular mathematics, could become agents for social and material progress. In a short article written a few years after the preface, Russell describes his early belief that the study of mathematics could help humanity achieve a better society and a higher state of wellbeing:
I had thoughts of mathematics, as the Russians still do, as primarily a help in making machines, and in day-dreams I have seen myself inventing some wonderful labour-saving device … I began to hope that human motives could be treated like forces in mechanics, and to imagine a quasi-mathematical psychology which would have been something like that in the third book of Spinoza's ethics. Russell identiWed these thoughts as arising from his reading of CliTord, from whom he adopted the idea that mathematics was the exemplar of reason, and that reason was the foundation of all sound belief. 6 The search for certainty of belief through sound reasoning was connected, for Russell, with social and material progress. Through the acquisition of sound and certain knowledge, Russell believed that the human race might become "more humane, more tolerant, and more enlightened, with the consequence that war and disease and poverty, and the other major evils of our existence, would continually diminish" (Papers z 11: 320). As such, mathematics, the most important and potentially precise kind of reasoning, became the focus of Russell's larger quest to Wnd certainty in knowledge (PfM, p. 10). "In this beneWcent process", Russell wrote in his preface, rational knowledge was to be the chief agent, and mathematics, as the most completely rational kind of knowledge, was to be in the van. This faith was CliTord's, and it was mine when I Wrst read his book; in turning over its pages again, the ghosts of the old hopes rise up to mock me.
(Papersz 11: 320)
It is odd that Russell identiWes his "old hopes" as having arisen from The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, since this book does not cast certainty of belief or sound reasoning as agents of social progress. Nor are these sentiments strongly evidenced in CliTord's collected Lectures and Essays, though Russell may have read some of his own enthusiasm into "On the Aims and Instruments of ScientiWc Thought" (1872).
7 Though a great deal of that lecture is taken up with emphasizing the gap between the exactness of the mathematical sciences and the approximations of the experimental ones, CliTord does argue that scientiWc thought is not thought about scientiWc matters but thought of a certain exact and evidence-guided kind about any matter at all. He looks forward, for example, to the development of psychology as an exact science (p. 142), and he scorns any idea, whether derived from Kant and the German idealists or from Herbert Spencer, of the ultimate unknowability of things. CliTord gets perhaps as close as he ever gets to stating Russell's 8 In Lectures and Essaysz, 1: 254-340. Russell made a summary of parts of this work in 1896 (ra1 210.006550-f4), though it is diUcult to see that it had any impact on his own thinking at this time. hopes at the end of the lecture:
By saying that the order of events is reasonable we do not mean that everything has a purpose, or that everything can be explained, or that everything has a cause; for neither of these is true. But we mean that to every reasonable question there is an intelligible answer, which either we or posterity may know by the exercise of scientiWc thought…. Remember, then, that it is the guide of action; that the truth which it arrives at is not that which we can ideally contemplate without error, but that which we may act upon without fear; and you cannot fail to see that scientiWc thought is not an accompaniment or condition of human progress, but human progress itself.
(Pp. 156-7)
The youthful Russell dreamed that the growth of rational knowledgez -z mathematics being the most rational knowledge of allz -z could ameliorate mankind. While Russell identiWed this as CliTord's thought, it may not be the case that CliTord held this view himself. Despite Russell's enthusiasm, CliTord's philosophy of mathematics, expressed most fully in "The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences", 8 was less than fully coherent, at least partly because CliTord's early death had cut short its development. The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences itself was left incomplete at his death and parts of the text were posthumously edited, revised and even written by Karl Pearson. Howard Smokler, in one of the few studies of CliTord's philosophy of mathematics, concluded that his account of arithmetic was "too obscure to be properly evaluated". 9 It was an amalgam of empiricist and rationalist elements. On the rationalist side, there were principles of organization, including principles by which sensory experience was arranged to yield distinct objects, a principle of the uniformity of nature, and principles for the analysis of concepts to give deWnitions. On the empirical side there was the sensory input itself and the process of counting. Starting from the concept of z "distinct object", the principle of the uniformity of nature was used to ensure that objects remained distinct throughout space and time and under diTerent arrangements. Through counting, numerals could be assigned to an ordered sequence of sets of distinct objects, each 10 set containing one more element than its predecessor. Finally, via the principles governing deWnition, arithmetical operations could be deWned in terms of counting. The approach had serious limitations, oTering no obvious way to extend the process to signed integers or real numbers. It is diUcult to discern what his attitude was to the real numbers, because he held that the science of number and the science of continuous quantity were two fundamentally diTerent things, the one founded on the "hypothesis of the distinctness of things" and the other on the "totally diTerent hypothesis of continuity". Nonetheless, he goes on to note the "close and extensive" relations between the two sciences; so close, indeed, as to leave one perplexed as to how two such similar sciences could be based upon apparently contradictory hypotheses. 10 Perhaps the best that can be said of CliTord's account is that, in spite of itself, it makes clear why mid-nineteenth-century mathematicians were looking for an arithmetical theory of continuous quantity, though CliTord himself thought such attempts were "logically false and educationally mischievous" (p. 337). Of these views, inasmuch as they appear in The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, Russell says diplomatically in his preface:
The opening chapter, on Number, although it says admirably what, in the seventies, seemed best worth saying, cannot tell the reader what is now known to be most important, since in this subject the great advances made by Dedekind, Cantor, and Frege came in the decade immediately following CliTord's death. He was, moreover, a geometer rather than an analyst, and it was in geometry that his mathematical intuition appeared at its best.
(Papers 11: 318)
CliTord's approach, for all its weaknesses to modern eyes, was not unsophisticated by the standards of its day. Reading it in 1888 probably inoculated Russell against Mill's much cruder account of arithmetic truths as inductive generalizations from empirical experience in A System of Logicz , 11 which he read two years later. Evidently he had not accepted CliTord's account of how we come by knowledge of arithmetic, but he must have recognized that CliTord's approach oTered rather better hopes of an explanation than Mill's.
The main positive lesson that Russell took from CliTord's book con- 12 Cf. "The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences", pp. 295-300. 13 Garciadiego, pp. 47-8. See also Papers 11: 318. 14 Who was responsible for writing the whole of the key chapter on position (Chap. 4). cerned geometry. When he Wrst read the book, Russell had only recently learnt of non-Euclidean geometry and, like many people in that position, was considerably perplexed by it. It must have seemed, at the very least, a dire warning of human fallibility. CliTord did not ignore that aspect of it, emphasizing that what had previously been taken to be certain and exact knowledge of even those parts of the universe that were inaccessible to human observation, was no longer certain, could not be established as exact, and could not be assumed to hold everywhere.
12 But unlike many philosophers who thought that non-Euclidean geometry must be resisted lest thought refute itself, CliTord maintained that this was a great step forward, as important as that taken by Copernicus, and an intellectual adventure as well, a "relief from the dreary inWnities of homaloidal space" (ibid., p. 323). From a philosophical point of view, it is hard to overstate the elegance and clarity with which CliTord presents the new geometries in the third of the lectures on the philosophy of the pure sciences; the presentation in The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences is much briefer and more purely didactic. Nonetheless, reading the latter book laid to rest, at least to a limited extent, Russell's feeling of geometrical doubt that had been occasioned by non-Euclidean geometry (MPD, p. 36), no doubt, as Garciadiego suggests, 13 by helping him understand that nonEuclidean geometries do not contradict the Euclidean one. " [W] hat I read in this book", he said, "did much to diminish the bewilderment I had been feeling. In spite of all the work that has since been done, hardly anything that CliTord (or Karl Pearson 14 ) says on this subject could be bettered by a writer in the present day" (Papers 11: 318).
It is surprising, then, considering how emphatically Russell cites CliTord's book as an early inXuence on his thought, to Wnd that when Russell came to work on the philosophy of non-Euclidean geometry for his Wrst philosophical book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), based on his fellowship dissertation of 1895, he not only largely ignores CliTord's work, but dismisses as impossible kinds of geometry on which CliTord had set much store. Russell makes only two brief references to CliTord in his Essay. Both cite CliTord as being among a number of scientists who hold "a naïve realism as regards absolute space" and 15 Russell, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 93, 97. Further references to Russell's Essayz (abbreviated as EFGy) refer to this edition, which is a reprint of the 1897 original published by Cambridge University Press. Routledge reissued the Essay in 1996 with a typesetting that changed the page numbers from the original and Dover editions.
16 "The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences", Lectures and Essays, 1: 320.
who investigate physical space "in the spirit of a chemist discussing whether hydrogen is a metal, or an astronomer discussing the nebula hypothesis". 15 In his Wrst reference to CliTord, Russell says that CliTord "seems to have thought that we actually see the images of things on the retina", which Russell uses to illustrate his point that CliTord conceives geometry as he does physics, as "an experimental science" (EFG, pp. 93, 94). CliTord does see the science of space as entirely empirical and subject to the limits of physical perception. He explains in "The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences" that each experience of space is "Wlled in" by our thought, not at random but by certain rules. He gives as an example the fact that "Parallelism is impossible on the curved pictures of my retina; so [the condition that we call parallel] is part of the Wlling in [of our thought]" (p. 261). In Russell's second reference, he notes that CliTord's empirical view of space leads him to Wnd current evidence wholly insuUcient to decide the nature of space on scales of the inWnite and the inWnitesimal (EFG, p. 97). Russell refers to a passage where CliTord states that "Even apart, then, from our knowledge of the way nerves act in carrying messages, it appears that we have no means of knowing anything more about an aggregate than that it is too Wne grained for us to perceive its discontinuity, if it has any." 16 Russell argues that more than one model of space could be acceptable to our a priori need to intuit space, and so he agreed with CliTord that the philosophical possibility of non-Euclidean geometry as the structure of space demoted the science of space to the level of empirical uncertainty existent in chemistry or astronomy. As Russell admits, the science of space is now "left to the mercy of approximate observations of stellar trianglesz -z a meagre support, indeed, for the cherished religion of our childhood [i.e. Euclidean geometry]" (EFG, p. 97). Russell acknowledges that nonEuclidean geometry has opened up the possibility that space is nonEuclidean (a possibility that he takes very seriously). But he does not accept CliTord's more radical suggestion that space may have a variable curvature, let alone his conjecture that non-constant curvature may ex- plain the eTects of various physical forces.
It is this last point which makes CliTord's position so radical. In the most famous of CliTord's speculations on the topic, "On the SpaceTheory of Matter" (1870), a paper which exists only as an abstract 17 and which is sometimes cited as an anticipation of Einstein's general theory of relativity, he suggests that curvature "is continually being passed from one portion of space to another after the manner of a wave", that the resulting variation in curvature is what "we call the motion of matterz ", and that "in the physical world nothing else takes place but this variation" (p. 22). He reports that he has been attempting to explain "in a general way" the laws of double refraction on this hypothesis, "but have not yet arrived at any results suUciently decisive to be communicated" (ibid.). 18 The idea that the curvature of space may have physical causes is one that hardly Wgures at all in Lectures and Essays. But it does reappear stated quite strongly in The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, albeit in passages actually written by Karl Pearson. 19 In particular, the chapter on position, which was entirely written by Pearson, concludes with the following paragraph:
These postulates [of geometry] are not, as is too often assumed, necessary and universal truths; they are merely axioms based on our experience of a certain limited region.… The danger of asserting dogmatically that an axiom based on the experience of a limited region holds universally will now be to some extent apparent to the reader. It may lead us to entirely overlook, or when suggested at once reject, a possible explanation of phenomena. The hypotheses that space is not homaloidal, and again, that its geometrical character may change with time, may or may not be destined to play a great part in the physics of the fu-ture; yet we cannot refuse to consider them as possible explanations of physical phenomena, because they may be opposed to popular dogmatic belief in the universality of certain geometrical axiomsz-za belief which has arisen from centuries of indiscriminating worship of the genius of Euclid.
(Pp. 203-4)
Just before this, Pearson added the following, more deWnite note of his own:
The most notable physical quantities which vary with position and time are heat, light, and electro-magnetism. It is these which we ought peculiarly to consider when seeking for any physical changes, which may be due to changes in the curvature of space….
[I]f we assume as an axiom that space resists curvature with a resistance proportional to the change, we Wnd that waves of "space-displacement" are precisely similar to those of the elastic medium [the ether] which we suppose to propagate light and heat. We also Wnd that "space-twist" is a quantity exactly corresponding to magnetic induction, and satisfying relations similar to those which hold for the magnetic Weld. It is a question whether physicists might not Wnd it simpler to assume that space is capable of a varying curvature, and of a resistance to that variation, than to suppose the existence of a subtle medium pervading an invariable homaloidal space.
(Ibid., p. 203n.)
It was perhaps sheer misfortune that Pearson did not include gravitation, along with heat, light and electromagnetism, as a physical phenomenon that might be susceptible of a geometrical explanation, for it was gravitation that proved susceptible to such an explanation in Einstein's general theory of relativity. Although Russell makes no mention of CliTord's radical theory in his Essay, he was certainly cognizant of it. In an 1893 paper he wrote for James Ward's course on metaphysics, Russell attempts to defend Kant's view of geometry from the spectre of non-Euclidean descriptions of space. In this paper he writes, "W.xK. CliTord even hints, in his wild enthusiastic way, that changes of shape such as we ascribe to changes of temperature, etc., might possibly be explicable as due to changes in the measure of curvature of space; this suggestion is of course rather preposterous …" (Papersz 1: 127). Russell admitted non-Euclidean spaces of constant curvature as a priori in his Essay, a qualiWed version of his complete defence of Kant in this 1893 paper. That was as far as he was willing to admit, in 1897, that new geometries had import for the science of space. We should note, however, that in holding this position, Russell 20 In his review of the Essay in Science, Halstead praises Russell for admitting the empirical and unknown nature of the actual curvature of space, noting that other philosophers continue to subordinate non-Euclidean spaces in favour of Euclidean ones. On the other hand, Halstead was scathingly critical of certain historical inaccuracies Russell made in Chapter 1. See G.xB. Halstead, "The Foundations of Geometry", Science 6 (1897): 487-91. 21 Hermann von Helmholtz, "Ueber die thatsächlichen Grundlagen der Geometrie" (1866) and "Ueber die thatsächlichen, die der Geometrie zum Grunde liegen" (1868), in his Wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen (Leipzig: Barth, 1882-95), 2: 610-39. 22 The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, pp. 200-1n.
was more radical than some of his colleagues.
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In his preface to the 1946 edition of CliTord's Common Sense, Russell described CliTord's insight into the relation of physics to geometry as "prophetic". He commented: "All that is said [by CliTord] on the relation of geometry to physics is entirely in harmony with Einstein's theory of gravitation, which was published thirty-six years after CliTord's death" (Papers z 11: 317). Nonetheless, the view of geometry that CliTord advocated and that underlay general relativity was one that Russell, in the Essay, declared to be impossible on a priori grounds. Later in life Russell acknowledged that "Einstein's revolution swept away everything at all resembling [the] point of view" of the Essay (MPD, p. 40).
ii. russell, whitehead, and the theory of measurement in geometries of variable curvature
Russell's purpose in the Essay was to determine, in the light of nonEuclidean geometry, which geometrical principles were a priori and which a posteriori. In formulating the principles Russell was much inXuenced by Helmholtz, 21 in particular in adopting the principle that space is homogeneous, that is, it has everywhere the same curvature. Russell argued in the Essay that the homogeneity was an a priori requirement of the concept of space; curvature could be positive, negative or zero (that, for Russell, was an empirical matter), but it must of necessity be everywhere the same (EFG, p. 149). CliTord strongly disagreed with the idea of raising the homogeneous curvature of space to the level of a philosophical postulate. 22 CliTord was astutely aware of the limits that conWned speculation regarding the actual nature of physical space. The most apt geometrical description of space was to CliTord a strictly empirical question, to which he could not provide a certain answer, since 23 Ibid., pp. 201, 203; "Philosophy of the Pure Sciences", pp. 320-3. 24 the experience of space on a human level reveals nothing of the true character of space on scales ranging from the inWnitely small to the inWnitely large. 23 Russell, in contrast, defended the Kantian idea that certain a priori axioms of space are necessary for human experience. Such axioms are achieved through logical analysis and philosophical argumentation; once analyzed such axioms are held to be beyond empirical testability, as human experience simply could not have them any other way. It was CliTord's opinion that assertions concerning the absolute, a priori truth of a certain geometry stemmed from a kind of dogmatic thinking "rather characteristic of the mediaeval theologian than of the modern scientist". 24 There may be something in the view that Russell's attachment to the a priori in geometry derived from his early, quasi-religious desire for certainty. As an adolescent, Russell began to look towards the discipline of mathematics as the area within which he might Wnd certain knowledge: "I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. I thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere" (PfM, p. 53). When Russell was eighteen he rejected Christianity and became agnostic. Scholars who have studied Russell's life have noted the connection between Russell's loss of religious faith and his search for certainty in mathematics. There was indeed considerable Victorian anguish on the very point which concerns us. 25 Russell's biographers have documented the role his "mathematical mysticism" played in the unfolding of his early life's work (e.g. Monk); other Russell scholars have made a study of his "personal religion". 26 It took a long time for Russell to become comfortable in his agnosticism. Something of this can be seen in his remark, not to be taken too seriously, that CliTord's approach to geometry left "meagre support" for the "religion of our childhood" (quoted above). It can be seen also, without tongue in cheek, in the remark that immediately follows, that "the possibility of an inaccuracy so slight, that our Wnest instruments and our most distant 27 J. Richards, Mathematical Visions: the Pursuit of Geometry in Victorian England z (San Diego: Academic P., 1988), pp. 112-13. 28 All the arguments are discussed in detail in N. GriUn, Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1991), pp. 154-63. 29 Russell cites particular instances at many places in his writings between 1893 and 1897; e.g. Papers 2: 124, 273-4, 295-6; EFG, p. 157. The general case is argued at Papers 2: 55-6, 78-9.
parallaxes show no trace of it" which CliTord's account of geometry would leave open, "would trouble men's minds no more than the analogous chance of inaccuracy on the law of gravitation, were it not for the philosophical import of even the slenderest possibility in this sphere" (EFG, p. 97). The a priori in geometry was not to be given up lightly.
CliTord, by contrast, rejoiced rather than mourned on the occasion of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. CliTord did not wish to have the kind of certain transcendental knowledge about the universe in all its immensity and eternity that Euclidean geometry had seemed to oTer. To CliTord, such universally applicable knowledge seemed simply unattainable. Joan Richards links this aspect of CliTord's philosophy of science with his personal agnosticism, a view that for him came very close to atheism. 27 CliTord, like Russell, gave up religious faith in his youth, under the inXuence of the debate surrounding the signiWcance of Darwin's Origin of Species. While CliTord abandoned his religious faith without regret, Russell, after giving up religion at the age of eighteen, transferred his lingering desire for religious faith into his search for certainty in mathematics.
But such social-constructivist explanations, though interesting (and sometimes plausible), can hardly give a full account of the matter. In the nature of things, they leave the explanandumz radically underdetermined, and in an area where it might be expected to be rather closely determined. Russell, after all, had, or at least thought he had, good reasons for holding that the constant curvature of space was an a priori necessity. The most important of his reasons is the following transcendental argument from the possibility of measurement. 28 Russell argues, Wrst, that all measurement depends upon the measurement of space. It is easy to conWrm this in particular cases: time is measured by the apparent motion of the sun, weight by the stretching of a spring, temperature by the height of mercury in a thermometer, etc. 29 The claim, of course, cannot be conclusively demonstrated by citing examples alone, but it seems plausible 30 Cf. The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, pp. 90-1. 31 Russell repeats the argument that distance cannot be measured in spaces of variable curvature in his 1902 article on non-Euclidean geometry for the tenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (cf. Papers 3: 492-3). nonetheless and CliTord seems inclined to agree with it. 30 Russell's second point is that in any space of constant curvature spatial measurement is always assured by means of congruence relations between spatial Wgures which are preserved no matter how the Wgures are moved through space. This, however, he maintains would not be possible in a space of variable curvature. In such a geometry, he writes, suppose that "the length of an inWnitesimal arc in some standard position were dsz ; then in any other position p its length would be ds . fy(p), where the form of the function fy(p) must be supposed known. But how are we to determine the position pz z ?" (EFG, p. 152). To do so, we require p's coordinates, i.e., "some measurement of distance from the origin", but this will require knowing what the function fy(p) is. Russell continues:
For suppose the origin to be O, and Op to be a straight line whose length is required. If we have a measuring rod with which we travel along the line and measure successive inWnitesimal arcs, the measuring rod will change its size as we move, so that an arc which appears by the measure to be ds will really be fy(s) . ds, where sz is the previously traversed distance. If, on the other hand, we move our line Op slowly through the origin, and measure each piece as it passes through, our measure, it is true, will not alter, but now we have no means of discovering the law by which any element has changed its length in coming to the origin. Hence, until we assume our function fy(p), we have no means of determining p…. It follows that experience can neither prove nor disprove the constancy of shapes throughout motion, since, if shapes were not constant, we should have to assume a law of their variation before measurement became possible, and therefore measurement could not itself reveal that variation to us.
(EFG, pp. 152-3)
Thus Russell concludes that unless space is of constant curvature, spacemeasurement is impossible, and if space-measurement is impossible, no form of measurement is possible. Thus the constant curvature of space is a necessary a priori condition for the possibility of measurement.
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Now this, on the face of it, seems to us a rather strong argument and one which thus bodes ill for general relativity unless it can in some way be rebutted. And so, indeed, it seemed to Whitehead, to the point that, 32 Whitehead's theory is presented most thoroughly in The Principle of Relativity (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1922), where, between lectures on the philosophy of nature and mathematical notes on the theory of tensors, the physical aspects of the theory are presented with Einsteinian brevity. But the philosophical basis for it can also be found in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1925; 1st edn. 1919) and The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1955; 1st edn. 1920), which has a user-friendly summary in Chapters 8 and 9. The basic idea is also stated very brieXy at the end of Process and Reality: an Essay in Cosmology, corrected edn., ed. D.yR. GriUn and D.yW. Sherburne (New York: Free P., 1978), pp. 332-3. Russell, in his own book on relativity, The ABC of Relativity (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925), makes no mention of Whitehead's dissent, nor of the underlying issue. 33 The Principle of Relativity, p. v. 34 Ibid. "Casual heterogeneity" was a frequent term of abuse: cf. also pp. 25, 65. 35 Whitehead never refers to Russell's parallel argument in the Essay. In part this was probably because Whitehead was well aware that Russell had repudiated the entire when general relativity was proposed, he put forward an alternative theory which preserved the constant curvature of space. 32 Whitehead presents his theory in a Euclidean space which is pervaded by two Welds representing mass impetus and electromagnetic impetus, thus preserving "the old division between physics and geometry". 33 But he uses Euclidean geometry only because he thinks it provides "the simplest exposition of the facts of nature"; any geometry of constant curvature would serve his purpose equally well: "[i]t is this uniformity which is essential to my outlook" against what he refers to as the "casual heterogeneity of … Einstein's later theory".
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It was the "casual heterogeneity" of space on Einstein's theory which, Whitehead thought, would render the concept of distance meaningless:
I cannot understand what meaning can be assigned to the distance of the sun from Sirius if the very nature of space depends upon casual intervening objects which we know nothing about. Unless we start with some knowledge of a systematically related structure of space-time we are dependent upon the contingent relations of bodies which we have not examined and cannot prejudge.
(Ibid., pp. 58-9)
The basis of his complaint was that distance had to be deWned in terms of congruence and congruence could only be deWned in spaces of constant curvature. This was essentially the same objection as Russell had brought against geometries of variable curvature twenty-Wve years previously. 35 The actual arguments which Whitehead gave in his books for philosophical position that underlay the Essay. But it may also have been because Russell may have got the basic idea of the dependence of space measurement on constancy of curvature from Whitehead himself when he was Whitehead's student. There seems no way to conWrm this because there is no evidence to suggest when Whitehead came by the idea; it seems, however, very unlikely that it was in reaction to studying the general theory of relativity. 36 Cf. The Principle of Relativity, Chap. 3, and The Concept of Nature, Chap. 6. C.yD. Broad, in his obituary of Whitehead (Mindz 57 [1948] : 143-4), complains vehemently of the extent to which Whitehead's work on relativity was ignored by the scientiWc community, but notes that Whitehead himself was partly to blame on account of the obscurity of his writings. Einstein himself did not ignore it, but confessed in conversation: "I simply do not understand Whitehead"z -z which gives some idea of the problem (F.yS.yC. Northrop, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science", in P.yA. Schilpp this conclusion are long and obscure and pervaded by the sort of terminological innovation for which he is notorious and which preclude a brief summary. 36 But in this case, mercifully, Whitehead provided his own summary in a newspaper article:
Now the spatial and temporal relations of event-particles to each other are expressed by the existence in space (in whatever sense that term is used) of points, straight lines, and planes. The qualitative properties and relations of these spatial elements furnish the set conditions which are a necessary prerequisite of measurement. For it must be remembered that measurement is essentially the comparison of operations which are performed under the same set [ofz] assigned conditions. If there is no possibility of assigned conditions applicable to diTerent circumstances, there can be no measurement. We cannot, therefore, begin to measure in space until we have determined a non-metrical geometry and have utilized it to assign the conditions of congruence agreeing with our sensible experiences…. For this reason I doubt the possibility of measurement in space which is heterogeneous as to its properties in diTerent parts. I do not understand how the Wxed conditions for measurement are to be obtained. In other words, I do not see how there can be deWnite rules of congruence applicable under all circumstances. This objection does not touch the possibility of physical spaces of any uniform type, non-Euclidean or Euclidean. But Einstein's interpretation of his procedure postulates measurement in heterogeneous physical space, and I am very sceptical as to whether any real meaning can be attached to such a concept. 37 If all this is correct, then the general theory of relativity must be conceptually confused and Russell was certainly right to ignore CliTord's geometry of curvature when he wrote the Essay.
Now it was a signal merit of Whitehead's theory that it had empirical consequences. Where Einstein's theory disagreed with Newton's, Whitehead's agreed with Einstein's. This covered the three main early experimental tests of general relativity: the motion of the perihelion of Mercury, the solar eclipse observations, and the gravitational red shift. But there were at least two eTects on which Whitehead's theory diTered from Einstein's: one concerned solar spectral lines, where Whitehead's theory predicted a speciWc interference between gravitational and electromagnetic eTects, and the other arose from the notoriously diUcult two-body problem in general relativity, where Whitehead's theory predicted a secular acceleration of the centre of mass of two bodies. Both eTects were too small to permit conWrmation of the theory in Whitehead's day. Interest seems to have focused on the second eTect, perhaps because the lack of general (or indeed, in those days, of any) solutions to the twobody problem in general relativity was seen as a problem for the theory. Whitehead calculated the eTect for the motion of the moon and tried to conWrm it using astronomical tables, but without success. In 1937 LeviCivita 38 published the surprising result that the same eTect was predicted from general relativity and might be observed before too long in the motion of binary stars. Levi-Civita's results, however, were quickly thrown into question in papers by Robertson and Eddington and Clark, and Levi-Civita retracted his report. 39 The general consensus now is that
Whitehead's solution of the two-body problem is refuted by experience, a result conWrmed most decisively by extremely accurate measurements of the gravitational eTects of the tides. 40 There remain those who are unconvinced, 41 but it would seem reasonable to conclude that Whitehead's theory has been experimentally refuted.
This, however, by no means ends our concerns. Whitehead's alternative theory of gravitation may well be wrong, but his critique of Einstein's theory may well be correctz -z and, if it is, Russell's early dismissal of CliTord would be vindicated. The crucial issue for this paper is not whether Whitehead's theory is correct, but whether Einstein's theory can give a logically coherent and physically meaningful account of measurement. This is an exceedingly complicated problem, and no new steps towards its solution will be taken here. The key to the solution is the role that the velocity of light plays in Einstein's theory, a role which was explicitly denied by Whitehead. While this much is agreed on all sides, many detailed proposals end up giving circular deWnitions. Two that, so far as we can see, do not are given by Basri 42 and Graves 43 ; both are exceptionally complex. Basri gives an ingenious operational deWnition of spatial interval and shows how to construct coordinate systems in arbitrary Welds. This, on its own, is suUcient to reply to Whitehead's objection. Graves, more generally, shows how spatio-temporal intervals, the metric tensor, and the Riemann curvature tensor, can all be measured without circularity using only the resources of general relativity. Assum-ing these results to be correct, Russell was right in claiming that Einstein's revolution swept away the philosophical position he had defended in An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. But whether, in 1959 in My Philosophical Development, he had adequate grounds for being quite so conWdent remains doubtful.
